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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Michael Jay Freitas appeals from the district court's opinion affirming his 
conviction for transferring water in violation of Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10. 
Freitas claims he was entitled to dismissal because, he asserts, the ordinance is 
unconstitutional. Freitas also asserts claims of instructional error and that the 
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Freitas was providing water to a neighbor whose water had "been turned 
off due to non payment.,,1 (R., p.7.) As a result, Freitas was issued a citation for 
violating Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10. (R., p.5.) Freitas filed a motion to 
dismiss "on the grounds that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is unconstitutional on 
its face and as applied under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I §§ 1,13,14,15,21, Article XII § 2, article XV § 1,4,5." 
(R., p.14.) The magistrate denied the motion and the case proceeded to trial. 
(R., p.32.) The jury found Freitas guilty and the court imposed a fine. (R., pp.76, 
121-122.) Freitas filed a timely notice of appeal to the district court. (R., pp.123-
126.) 
Freitas appealed to the district court raising numerous claims. (R., 
pp.128-173.) The district court denied relief. (R., pp.209-229.) Freitas filed a 
1 The residence to which Freitas was providing water belonged to George 
Adams; however, the other individuals living at the residence included Brenda 
Nash and her son, daughter-in-law and three grandchildren. (Tr., p.100, Ls.20-
23, p.1 04, Ls.8-9, p.1 05, L.13 - p.1 06, LA, p.111, Ls.13-20.) 
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Freitas states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Whether Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is sufficiently clear to 
satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
II. Whether Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 conflicts with the 
General Laws of Idaho. 
III. Whether Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is confined to Spirit 
Lake. 
IV. Whether Spirit Lake Ordinance 7 -4-10 is improper, 
unreasonable and/or arbitrary. 
V. Whether Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 as applied to this 
case violates the liberty of conscience guaranteed by the 
Idaho and United State [sic] Constitutions. 
VI. Whether the Magistrate Court misinterpreted the statute and 
thus the defendant was tried under the wrong elements. 
VII. Whether the Magistrate Court erred in denying the 
defendant's motion for acquittal. 
VIII. Whether the Court erred in refusing to give the defendant's 
proposed jury instruction six. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.1 0.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Freitas failed to establish he was entitled to dismissal based on his 
claim that Spirit Lake City Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague? 
2. Has Freitas failed to demonstrate the ordinance was otherwise invalid? 
3. Has Freitas failed to establish the district court erred in rejecting his claims 
of instructional error? 
4. Has Freitas failed to show the district court erred in concluding there was 




The District Court Correctly Concluded Freitas Was Not Entitled To Dismissal 
Based On Freitas' Assertion That Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 Is 
Unconstitutionally Vague 
A. Introduction 
Freitas asserts "Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is void for vagueness on its 
face." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Application of the relevant legal standards shows 
the district court correctly concluded otherwise and affirmed Freitas' motion to 
dismiss on this basis. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court 
reviews it de novo. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706,711,69 P.3d 126, 131 
(2003). The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome 
a strong presumption of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the 
statute. kL. The appellate court is obligated to seek a construction of a statute 
that upholds its constitutionality. kL. 
C. Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague 
Freitas contends "Spirit lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is void for vagueness on its 
face." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) The district court correctly affirmed the 
magistrate's decision rejecting this argument. 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine rests upon the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and requires that a penal statute define a criminal 
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what 
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conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman 
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982); State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 
126, 131 (2003). "A statute may be void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate 
notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes, or if 
it fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who 
must enforce the statute." State v. Fluewelling, 150 Idaho 576, 578, 249 P .3d 
375,377 (2011) (quoting Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712,69 P.3d at 132). "It has long 
been held that a statute should not be held void for uncertainty if any practical 
interpretation can be given the statute." State v. Larsen, 135 Idaho 754, 756, 24 
P.3d 702, 704 (2001). There is a strong presumption of constitutionality and the 
party challenging the statute must clearly show the invalidity of the statute. 
Olsen v. J. A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 709,791 P.2d 1285 (1990); State v. 
Nelson, 119 Idaho 444,447,807 P.2d 1282 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 reads: 
Every part of the city water system up to, and including, any 
shutoff valve and/or meter, which may be installed at or near the 
property line of any lot, is the property of the city. It shall be 
unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or tamper with, turn 
on or off, permit connection or delivery of water to third persons for 
use within a residence or other building not otherwise provided with 
water service in accordance with this chapter, or to operate or 
introduce any substance into any part of the city water system 
unless that person is acting under the direct supervision of a 
qualified employee of the city or first obtains express written 
permission from the mayor. 
In support of his claim that the ordinance is void for vagueness, Freitas 
asserts: "It is difficult to understand why the city would have concerned itself with 
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those interfering with the illegal use of water by others, or why the city is not 
concerned about people who connect illegally for their own use." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.i3.) Freitas further argues "the ordinance is essentially several 
sentences enmeshed in such a fashion that while an official may read what they 
choose from it, no ordinary person can possibly be expected to understand it." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.i?) Freitas then concludes "the law is too confusing to 
provide either reasonable persons or the government with any idea as to how it is 
meant to be enforced. Therefore, it must be struck down." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.i8.) 
Addressing Freitas' vagueness challenge, the district court found the 
ordinance could "be understandably broken down" as follows: 
1. The City of Spirit Lake owns the water system up to a shut off 
valve and/or water meter; 
2. It is unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or tamper 
with the City's water system unless allowed to do so by City 
ordinance; 
3. It is unlawful to turn on/off the City's water system unless 
allowed to do so by City ordinance; 
4. It is unlawful to allow someone to connect to the City water 
system unless allowed; 
5. It is unlawful to deliver water provided by the City's water system 
to someone who is not receiving City water when that water is to be 
used inside a residence or building that is not receiving City water; 
and 
6. It is unlawful to put any SUbstance into the City's water system 
without permission from a qualified City employee or the mayor of 
Spirit Lake. 
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(R., pp.214-215.) Thus, the court concluded the "Ordinance is not 
unconstitutionally vague on its face because its prohibitions are clearly defined 
and a person of ordinary intelligence would understand the Ordinance." (R., 
p.215.) 
Freitas claims the district court's conclusion was erroneous because, he 
argues, whether the statute can be "understandably broken down" "is not the 
test." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Freitas is incorrect. The district court's finding 
that the ordinance can be "understandably broken down" is consistent with the 
requirement that the ordinance "give adequate notice to people of ordinary 
intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes" and is directly responsive to 
Freitas' claim that the ordinance is "too confusing." On the other hand, what is 
"not the standard" for determining whether the ordinance is unconstitutionally 
vague is Freitas' complaint that he does not "understand why the city would have 
concerned itself with those interfering with the illegal use of water by others, or 
why the city is not concerned about people who connect illegally for their own 
use." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Whether Freitas thinks the city should "concern" 
itself with such matters is irrelevant to whether the ordinance is vague. 
Moreover, it is unclear how Freitas in particular can claim that he did not 
know that he was violating Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 since Officer Wise gave 
him specific notice of such when she issued a warning before citing Freitas when 
he failed to cease and desist his unlawful conduct. As noted by the court at 
sentencing, there are "other ways to handle a reasonable dispute regarding a 
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violation than to simply continue to be in violation and essentially thumb one's 
nose at the [ordinance]." (Tr., p.159, Ls.14-17.) 
Both the magistrate and district court both correctly concluded it was not 
and Freitas has failed to show error in that conclusion. 2 
II. 
Freitas Was Not Entitled To Dismissal On Any Other Theory 
Freitas raises several additional complaints about Ordinance 7-4-10 
including that Spirit lake "has no claim of ownership over water once it has been 
drawn," the ordinance "violates the limits set on municipal power," the ordinance 
is not "confined to the limits of Spirit Lake," and the ordinance is "improper, 
unreasonable and/or arbitrary." (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-30.) Freitas also 
asserts the ordinance violates the "First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 
2 In asserting that the court applied the incorrect "test," Freitas also asks this 
Court to overrule prior precedent and hold that a "facial-vagueness challenge 
does not require a showing that the law is unconstitutionally vague in all its 
applications." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) As recently as 2010, the Idaho Supreme 
Court, in addition to stating the same legal standards set forth above, also 
reiterated an "ordinance will only be found void for vagueness if it is 
unconstitutionally vague in all its applications." State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919, 925, 
231 P.3d 1016, 1022 (2010) (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-495 (1982)). According to Freitas, the 
Supreme Court modified the standard from Village of Hoffman Estates in 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) In particular, 
Freitas relies on a footnote in the majority opinion in Kolender that addresses a 
dissent. (Appellant's Brief, p.15 (citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 n.8).) The 
footnote Freitas cites from Kolender did not modify the legal standards from 
Village of Hoffman Estates. The Court said, "where a statute imposes criminal 
penalties, the standard of certainty is higher" and "[t]his concern has, at times, 
led us to invalidate a criminal statute on its face even when it could conceivably 
have had some valid application." Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 n.8 (emphasis 
added). These comments, in dicta, in a footnote, do not support Freitas' claim 
that the Idaho Supreme Court has been applying an erroneous legal standard in 
considering facial vagueness challenges. 
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Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I §§ 1, 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution as applied to the facts of this case." (Appellant's Brief, p.31.) All of 
these arguments lack merit. 
First, the purpose of Freitas' argument that Spirit Lake does not "retain a 
possessory interest in the water once it has been drawn" is not entirely clear. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.18.) To the extent Freitas makes such a claim because he 
believes he owned the water and could, therefore, do with it as he pleased, such 
a claim is irrelevant to the ordinance he was convicted of violating. Ordinance 7-
4-10 prohibits, in relevant part, "permit[ting] connection or delivery of water to 
third persons for use within a residence or other building not otherwise provided 
with water service." In other words, an individual cannot facilitate bypassing the 
city water system by allowing others to connect to his system unlawfully. Freitas' 
claim of ownership of the water is irrelevant to whether he permitted connection 
or delivery of water outside the scope of the city water system. As such, to the 
extent Freitas believes his ownership interest in the water itself required 
dismissal of the charge, he is incorrect. 
Second, Ordinance 7-4-10 does not violate the "limits set on municipal 
power" nor is it improper, unreasonable, or arbitrary. The district court rejected 
all of these arguments in a well-reasoned opinion, which the state adopts as its 
argument on appeal. (R., pp.215-221. 3) Freitas has failed to show error in the 
court's opinion on these claims. 
3 A copy of the entirety of the district court's Intermediate Appellate Opinion is 
attached hereto as Appendix A. 
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Third, Freitas complains Ordinance 7-4-10 "is not confined to the limits of 
Spirit Lake." (Appellant's Brief, p.24.) According to Freitas, the ordinance 
"makes no attempt to limit its scope to the City of Spirit Lake. Every person 
engaged in any chain of events that leads to the use of water in a home not 
provided that water in accordance with the municipality's ordinances will be in 
violation of these laws." (Appellant's Brief, p.25.) Freitas fears this "would of 
course be most of Idaho." (Appellant's Brief, p.25.) First, this argument is 
irrelevant because Freitas has failed to show any action by him was outside the 
boundaries of Spirit Lake. Second, a plain reading of the ordinance contradicts 
Freitas' argument. While there may be nothing in Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-
10 that expressly limits it to Spirit Lake (other than the fact that it is a city 
ordinance), there is likewise nothing in the ordinance that purports to extend its 
coverage beyond the city. Beyond the fact that it is a city ordinance, which 
implies that it is confined to the city, Ordinance 7-4-10 governs the "city water 
system." Freitas' extraordinary view of what he believes to be a far-reaching 
ordinance is unsupported by the language of the ordinance or logic. 
Finally, Freitas asserts Ordinance 7-4-10 violates the First, Fifth, Ninth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as Article I 
§§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution "as applied to the facts of this case." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.31.) In support of this broad constitutional claim, Freitas argues "free 
alienation is a property right" and "charitable giving is something more profound; 
it is a value that predates and is part and parcel of our rights." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.31.) Freitas also relies on biblical references to charity to support his argument 
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and suggests disbelief "that the expression of kindness that is charity is without 
constitutional protection." (Appellant's Brief, p.33.) Here, Freitas introduces the 
constitutional underpinnings of his claim, noting the "protection" may come from 
the "First, Fifth, Ninth or Fourteenth Amendment[s]," or perhaps "a 
conglomeration of the four." (Appellant's Brief, p.33.) Although unsure of where 
his argument finds support in the constitution, Freitas contends a "law that 
punishes giving water to the poor and thirsty ... abominable." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.33.) 
There is a reason Freitas struggles to identify a constitutional provision 
upon which to base his claim - it is because one does not exist. Regardless of 
how altruistic his motives, and despite Freitas' efforts to frame his "crime" as 
giving water to the poor, the conduct prohibited by Ordinance 7-4-10 is not 
charity or simply giving a thirsty family water. It is, in Freitas' case, permitting the 
"connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a residence or 
other building not otherwise provided with water service" to allow access to the 
city water system by someone who had been denied service due to non-
payment. While Freitas views this as "criminalization of pure good," that is not 
the standard by which courts measure the constitutionality of a law. What the 
citizenry of this state may view as "pure good" that is entitled to protection is a 
legislative matter, not a constitutional one. Freitas' effort to avoid liability based 
on his act of "charity," even in the face of being told it was unlawful, fails. 
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I" . 
Freitas Has Failed To Establish The Court Committed Instructional Error 
A. Introduction 
Freitas raises two instructional error claims: (1) the jury was incorrectly 
instructed on the elements of the offense; and (2) error in the denial of his 
request for an instruction on ownership of the water. (Appellant's Brief, pp.35-36, 
38-39.) Because Freitas consented to the elements instruction given, he cannot 
complain it was incorrect. Alternatively, his claim that the elements instruction 
was erroneous fails on the merits. Freitas' claim of error regarding his instruction 
about ownership of the water also fails because the court was not required to 
give such an instruction. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this 
Court exercises free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 
414, 430 (2009). "An error in jury instructions only constitutes reversible error 
when the instruction misled the jury or prejudiced the party challenging the 
instruction." !!i (citation omitted). "If the instructions, considered as a whole, 
fairly and adequately present the issues and state the applicable law, then no 
error has been committed." !si. (quotations, citation and brackets omitted). 
C. Because Freitas Consented To The Elements Instruction, His Claim Of 
Error In Relation To That Instruction Is Precluded By The Invited Error 
Doctrine; Alternatively, The Claim Fails On The Merits 
Freitas asserts the elements instruction given by the magistrate was 
incorrect. (Appel/ant's Brief, pp.35-36.) Freitas, however, consented to the 
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instruction given. The record shows that before the final instructions to the jury, 
the court held an instruction conference off the record. (Tr., p.133, Ls.12-15.) 
When the parties came back on the record, the court asked Freitas: "Is it correct 
that you have no objection to the giving of state's elements instruction?" (Tr., 
p.133, L.25 - p.134, L.2.) Counsel for Freitas responded: "That's correct, your 
Honor." (Tr., p.134, L.3.) Freitas also acknowledged he withdrew his "alternate 
elements instructions." (Tr., p.135, Ls.2-4.) Given that Freitas consented to the 
elements instruction given, he cannot now complain it was erroneous. State v. 
Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 187, 254 P.3d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 2011) ("The doctrine of 
invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his or her own 
conduct induces the commission of the error."). 
Despite his acquiescence in the instruction, Freitas nevertheless 
complains it was erroneous, arguing "the ordinance, if read according to the rules 
of statutory construction for criminal statutes, has nothing to do with this case." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.36.) That Freitas does not believe the ordinance penalizes 
his conduct does not, however, mean the elements instruction was erroneous. 
Freitas' argument in this regard is nothing more than a variation of his claim that 
he was entitled to dismissal prior to trial. As noted, Freitas was not entitled to 
dismissal on any basis and his claim that the elements instruction was otherwise 
erroneous fails. 
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D. Freitas Was Not Entitled To An Instruction On Ownership Of The City 
Water 
Freitas requested a jury instruction that read: "The Spirit Lake city water 
system is property of the city up to and including any shutoff valve and/or meter 
which may be installed at or near the property line of any lot." (R., p.42.) Freitas 
argued the instruction was appropriate in light of his belief that the water was his 
after it passed through his meter and instructing the jury as requested would 
"shed[ ] some light on what [his] conversation" with Officer Wise was about. (Tr., 
p.135, L.25 - p.136, L.8.) The magistrate rejected Freitas' instruction because 
"it's not a clarifying ... lega/ instruction that relates to any of the facts in dispute." 
(Tr., p.135, Ls.17-19.) On intermediate appeal, the district court agreed the 
instruction was not appropriate because it did "not speak to the pertinent charge 
of unlawful delivery of water." (R., p.226.) 
Freitas argues the court erred in declining to give an instruction on 
ownership because, he asserts, "the intention of the statute was to criminalize 
someone tapping directly into the city's waterline and taking water and providing 
it to those who are not receiving their water legally from the city." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.39.) As with his claim of error in relation to the elements instruction, 
Freitas' argument is that he was entitled to dismissal based on his belief that the 
ordinance does not prohibit his conduct. This is not an instructional error claim 
and Freitas' attempt to convert it into one should be rejected. 
Further, Freitas' requested instruction is not a correct statement of the law. 
The ordinance reads that "[e]very part of the city water system up to, and 
including, any shutoff valve and/or meter, which may be installed at or near the 
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property line of any lot, is the property of the city." Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. 
Freitas' instruction did not accurately state this portion of the ordinance. Instead, 
Freitas' instruction sought to rephrase the language of the ordinance to support 
his claim of ownership over the water. That is not what the relevant portion of the 
ordinance addresses. The language of the ordinance at issue addresses the 
city's ownership of the "water system," not the water itself. Freitas' requested 
instruction was not proper and, as found by the district court, the magistrate 
correctly declined to give it. See Severson, 147 Idaho at 710,215 P.3d at 430 
(trial court only required to give instructions that are "correct and pertinent" - an 
instruction does not satisfy this requirement if it is "(1) an erroneous statement of 
the law; (2) adequately covered by other instructions; or (3) not supported by the 
facts of the case"). 
IV. 
Freitas Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Conclusion That There 
Was Substantial Evidence Supporting The Verdict Finding Freitas Guilty Of 
Violating Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 
A. Introduction 
Freitas challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
conviction for violating Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. (Appellant's Brief, pp.36-
37.) Specifically, he contends the state failed to present sufficient evidence from 
which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that "the water [he] provided 
his neighbors came from the City of Spirit Lake." (Appellant's Brief, p.37.) 
Freitas' argument fails. A review of the evidence presented shows the district 
court correctly concluded that the state presented sufficient evidence from which 
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the jury could find Freitas violated Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. Freitas has 
failed to show he is entitled to an acquittal on the charged offense. 
8. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919.(Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761,735 P.2d 1070,1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting 
this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to 
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Knutson, 121 
Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 
1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are 
construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 
698,701,946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735 P.2d 
at 1072. 
C. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To Prove The Essential 
Elements Of Violating Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 
In order for the jury to find Freitas guilty of aggravated assault, the jury 
was instructed it had to find the state proved the following elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
1. On or about September 28,2012; 
2. In Kootenai County, State of Idaho; 
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3. Freitas permitted connection or delivery of city water; 
4. To third persons; 
5. For use within a residence; 
6. Not otherwise provided with water service. 
(Tr., p.140, Ls.17-24; also R., p.112 (Instruction No. 11).) 
Freitas contends the state failed to prove that the water at issue belonged 
to the city. (Appellant's Brief, pp.37-38.) According to Freitas, he "may have 
water from a different water system that goes through a meter." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.38.) Freitas' claim fails. 
At trial, Barbara Brown, the Spirit Lake clerk/treasurer testified she is the 
record keeper for the city water system. (Tr., p.96, L.19 - p.98, L.6.) She further 
testified that on September 28, 2012, the city was not supplying water to the 
Adams residence, although the water was later turned back on. (Tr., p.1 01, L.2 -
p.102, LA; Exhibit 1.) Brenda Nash, who was living in the Adams residence on 
September 28, 2012, along with several other individuals, testified they were 
using water in the residence that was coming from Freitas' house.4 (Tr., p.104, 
L.8 - p.106, L.23, p.111, Ls.13-20.) Officer Terry Wise testified that she 
contacted Freitas on September 27, 2012, to give him a warning that he was 
violating city code by providing water to the Adams residence. (Tr., p.120, L.7 -
p.121, L.5.) Officer Wise provided Nash a copy of the ordinance; she also 
provided a copy to Brenda Nash. (Tr., p.122, L.24 - p.123, LA.) The following 
day, September 28, 2012, Officer Wise went to Freitas' house again "to see if the 
4 Freitas was providing the water to the Adams residence via hoses connected 
from his outside spigot to Adams' house. (Tr., p.121, L.17 - p.122, L.20.) 
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hose was still between the two homes and if there was still water running." (Tr., 
p.125, Ls.7-10.) Because the connection was still active, and the water was still 
running, Officer Wise issued Freitas a citation. (Tr., p.125, Ls.11-18.) When 
Officer Wise gave Freitas the citation, Freitas said "he didn't think that there was 
anything wrong as far -- as long as the water was going through his meter and 
he's paying for it, that he ... should be able to do whatever he wanted to do with 
his water." (Tr., p.125, L.19-p.126, L.2; also p.126, Ls.16-23.) 
Contrary to Freitas' argument, this evidence was more than sufficient to 
establish that the water he was providing to the Adams residence was city water. 
The jury could reasonably infer that Freitas, like his neighbor, received water 
through the city water system, particularly given Freitas' acknowledgement that 
the water was metered and paid for by him - something that would be unlikely if 
he obtained his water through an alternate source, such as a well, which would 
presumably not be on a meter. The district court correctly concluded "there was 
substantial and competent evidence as to whether Freitas delivered 'city' water to 
the Adams residence." (R., p.224.) Freitas has failed to establish otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the intermediate appellate 
opinion of the district court. 
DATED this 24th day of February 2014. 
JES CA M. LORELLO 
DepG y Attorney General 
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Intermediate Appeal from the Magistrate's Division of the District Court of the First 
Judicial District, State ofIdaho, Kootenai County. Hon. Clark Peterson, Magistrate. 
Judgment of conviction for Unlawful Act Regarding Water System, affirmed. 
Jay Logsdon, Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender's Office, appeared and 
argued for Defendant-Appellant. 
Eileen McGovern, Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, appeared and argued 
for Plaintiff-Respondent. 
I. Statement of the Case 
This matter is a criminal appeal from the Magistrate's Division of the District 
Court involving a misdemeanor conviction from a Spirit Lake City ordinance relating to 
the City's water system. A jury found Defendant-Appellant Michael Jay Freitas (Freitas) 
guilty of Unlawful Act Regarding Water System. The magistrate entered a judgment of 
conviction and ordered Freitas to pay a fine. Freitas now appeals to this Court. 
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II. Factual and Procedural History 
Freitas lived next door to a residence located at 5822 West Rhode Island Street, 
Spirit Lake, Idaho; said residence owned by George Adams. l Water service to that 
residence had been turned off by the City on July 26,2012, for non-payment of service 
fees. 
On September 27, 2012, Spirit Lake Police Officer Terry Wise advised Freitas 
that he was in violation of Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 (the Ordinance) because he had 
water hoses running from Freitas's residence to Adams's. Officer Wise provided Freitas 
with a copy of the Ordinance and issued a verbal warning to discontinue delivery of 
water. Also on September 27, 2012, Brenda Nash (Nash), her son, his three children and 
his fiance moved into the residence with Adams. 2 
On September 28,2012, Officer Wise cited Freitas for providing city water to his 
neighbor's residence in violation of the Ordinance. On October 18, 2012, the water 
service to Adams's residence was restored. 
On December 12, 2012, Freitas filed his Motion to Dismiss. In his motion, 
Freitas argued that the Ordinance was unconstitutional, and even if the Ordinance was 
constitutional, it was unconstitutionally applied. In the alternative, Freitas argued that the 
Ordinance was void for vagueness. The state opposed the motion, and on January 3, 
2013, the matter came on for hearing. After hearing argument, the magistrate orally 
denied the Motion to Dismiss.3 
I George Adams was also referred to at trial as Darrell Adams. Trial Transcript, p.69 at" 17-19. 
2 Freitas asserts that six individuals were residing in the residence at the time. The trial transcript provides 
that Adams was also residing in the residence as well, totaling seven individuals. ld. at p. 70, ,~ 2-4. 
3 The appellate record does not contain a written order denying the Motion to Dismiss. 
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On January 8, 2013, the jury trial commenced. At the conclusion of the state's 
case, Freitas moved for a judgment of acquittal, which was denied. The jury returned a 
guilty verdict finding Freitas guilty of Unlawful Act Regarding Water System. Also, on 
January 8, 2013, the parties agreed to proceed to sentencing and Judgment was entered 
ordering Freitas to pay a fine of $500.00 within 30 days; no jailor probation was 
ordered.4 
On January 9, 2013, Freitas timely filed his Notice of Appeal. On January 16, 
2013, this Court entered its Order to Stay Sentence Pending Appeal. 
On March 12,2013, Freitas filed his Appellate Brief. On May 20,2013, the state 
filed its Respondent's Brief. On May 22, 2013, Freitas filed his Reply Brief. 
On July 1, 2013, this Court heard oral argument on appeal and deemed the matter 
fully submitted. 
III. Standards 
I.C.R. 54.17 provides: 
All appeals from a magistrate shall be heard by the district 
court as an appellate proceeding unless the district court 
orders a trial de novo as provided in these rules. The scope 
of appellate review on appeal to the district court shall be 
as follows: 
(a) Upon an appeal from a magistrate to the district court, 
not involving a trial de novo, the district court shall review 
the case on the record and determine the appeal as an 
appellate court in the same manner and upon the same 
standards of review as an appeal from the district court to 
the Supreme Court under the Idaho appellate rules. 
In assessing the sufficiency of evidence, we "will uphold a judgment of 
conviction entered upon a jury verdict so long as there is substantial evidence upon which 
4 Although I.C. § 50-302 provides the maximum fine for violation of an ordinance as up to $1,000.00, City 
of Spirit Lake Ordinance 1-4-1 (A) provides that the maximum penalty for violation of a Spirit Lake 
ordinance is only $300.00. This has not been raised or mentioned by either party on appeal. 
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a rational trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution proved all essential elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 
414, 432 (2009). "Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and 
rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been prove[n]." Id. On 
appeal, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 286, 77 P.3d 956, 975 (2003). Further, we "will not 
substitute our own judgment for that of the jury on matters such as the credibility of 
witnesses, the weight to be given to certain evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence." Severson, 147 Idaho at 712,215 P.3d at 432. 
When reviewing the decision of a district court acting in its appellate capacity 
over the magistrate division, Idaho appellate courts review the magistrate court's decision 
independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's intermediate appellate 
decision. Further, Idaho appellate courts will uphold the magistrate court's findings of 
fact if they are supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record. See Swanson 
v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P.3d 973, 976 (2000); Balderson v. Balderson, 127 
Idaho 48, 51, 896 P .2d 956, 959 (1995). With respect to conclusions oflaw, appellate 
courts exercise free review. Id. 
IV. Discussion 
Freitas asserts that the magistrate erred by: (1) finding the ordinance 
constitutional; (2) finding that the ordinance is constitutional under the facts of this case; 
(3) misinterpreting the statute resulting in Freitas being tried under the wrong elements; 
(4) denying Freitas's Motion for Acquittal; (5) refusing to give Freitas's proposed jury 
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instruction No.6; and (6) overruling Freitas's objections to the state's voir dire 
questioning. 
A. Is the ordinance vague on its face? 
Freitas first argues that the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague on its face and 
thus violates the notice requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution and Article I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Freitas asserts that the 
Ordinance has so many elements to it that it is "too confusing to provide either 
reasonable persons or the government with any idea as to how it is meant to be enforced." 
Appellant's Brief at p. 15. 
The State argues that the Ordinance is not ambiguous and its language is clear 
when given its commonly understood every day meanings. The Ordinance, the State 
asserts, prohibits a person from connecting or delivering Spirit Lake water to an 
individual for the use within a residence that is not otherwise provided with Spirit Lake 
city water. Therefore, a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that this is what 
the Ordinance states. 
City of Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 provides: 
UNLA WFUL ACT: 
Every part of the city water system up to, and including, 
any shutoff valve and/or meter, which may be installed at 
or near the property line of any lot, is the property of the 
city. It shall be unlawful for any person to connect to, 
interfere or tamper with, turn on or off, permit connection 
or delivery of water to third persons for use within a 
residence or other building not otherwise provided with 
water service in accordance with this chapter, or to operate 
or introduce any substance into any part of the city water 
system unless that person is acting under the direct 
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supervision of a qualified employee of the city or first 
obtains express written pennission from the mayor. 
(Ord. 430, 8-22-1998). 
City of Spirit Lake Ordinance 4-7 -11 provides: 
PENALTY FOR VIOLATION: 
Any person found to be guilty of a violation of this chapter 
shall be guilty of committing a misdemeanor offense. Each 
and every violation and each and every day or part of a day 
a violation continues shall be deemed a separate offense. 
The penalty for misdemeanor offenses is that prescribed by 
the most current Spirit Lake city ordinance prescribing the 
penalty for misdemeanor offenses. (Ord. 430, 8-22-1998). 
The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires 
that the laws of the U. S. and of the several states not be vague when defining criminal 
conduct. See, Idaho v. Korsen, 138 Ida40 706,711,69 P.3d 126,131 (2003), abrogated 
on other grounds by Evans v. Michigan, 133 S.Ct. 1069, 185 L.Ed.2d 124 (2013). The 
U.S. Constitution and policy requires that no [person] ... be required at the peril ofloss of 
liberty to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. Id. A statute is unconstitutional 
and therefore void-for-vagueness where its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Id. 
This Court finds that Ordinance 7-4-10 can be understandably broken down to 
provide: 
1. The City of Spirit Lake owns the water system up to a shut off valve and! or water 
meter; 
2. It is unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or tamper with the City's 
water system unless allowed to do so by City ordinance; 
3. It is unlawful to turn on/off the City's water system unless allowed to do so by 
City ordinance; 
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4. It is unlawful to allow someone to connect to the City water system unless 
allowed; 
5. It is unlawful to deliver water provided by the City's water system to someone 
who is not receiving City water when that water is to be used inside a residence or 
building that is not receiving City water; and 
6. It is unlawful to put any substance into the City's water system without 
permission from a qualified City employee or the mayor of Spirit Lake. 
Therefore, this Court finds that the Ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague on 
its face because its prohibitions are clearly defined and a person of ordinary intelligence 
would understand the Ordinance. As such, the magistrate did not err by denying Freitas's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
B. Is the Ordinance unconstitutionally vague when applied to the facts? 
Freitas argues that "criminalizing the act of charitably gifting water one has paid 
for to another goes beyond the boundaries of our national values .... " Appellant's Brief at 
p. 28. Further, Freitas argues that the Ordinance is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Article I §§ 1, 4, 14; Article XII § 2, and Article 
XV §§ 1, 4 and 5 of the Idaho Constitutions. Lastly, Freitas argues that because the 
ordinance goes beyond the boundaries of protecting to actually harming our society'S 
welfare[,] the Ordinance must be struck down. Appellant's Brief at p. 32. 
The State argues that Freitas connected and used a hose to deliver water from his 
hose to his neighbor's residence, which is exactly the conduct that the Ordinance 
prohibits. Further, Officer Wise informed Freitas of the violation of the Ordinance, 
provided Freitas with a copy of the Ordinance and gave him a warning to stop providing 
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the water to Adams' residence. This sufficiently provided Freitas with notice and the 
Ordinance provides courts and law enforcement guidelines for enforcement. Therefore, 
the State asserts that the Ordinance is not unconstitutional when applied to the facts of 
this case. 
A statute may be unconstitutionally vague as applied to the complainant's 
conduct. Burton v. Dep't oj Transp., 149 Idaho 746, 748, 240 P.3d 933, 935 (2010). A 
statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied if the statute failed to provide fair notice 
that the complainant's specific conduct was prohibited or failed to provide sufficient 
guidelines such that police had unbridled discretion in determining whether to charge the 
complainant. Id. 
A municipality may make and enforce "all such local police, sanitary and other 
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws. Caesar v. 
State, 101 Idaho 158, 161, 610 P .2d 517 (1980) (quoting Idaho Const. Art. XII, §2). This 
constitutional grant of powers is viewed as a grant of local police powers to Idaho cities. 
Id. The burden falls on the party challenging the validity of a police power to show that 
it is in conflict with the general laws of the state, unreasonable or arbitrary. Potts Const. 
Co. v. N Kootenai Water Dist., 141 Idaho 678, 682, 116 P.3d 8, 11 (2005) (citations 
omitted). Generally courts are not concerned with the wisdom of ordinances and will 
uphold a municipal ordinance unless it is clearly unreasonable or arbitrary. Id. Further, it 
is well recognized that the social objective of preventing financial hardship and possible 
reliance upon the welfare agencies of the state is a permissible goal of police power 
action. Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 101, 16 P.2d 46,49 (1966) (citations 
omitted). 
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Article XII § 2 of the Idaho Constitution provides: 
Local police regulations authorized. Any county or 
incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its 
limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations 
as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general 
laws. 
I.C. § 50-302 provides: 
Promotion of general welfare -- Prescribing penalties. 
(1) Cities shall make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules, 
regulations and resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of 
the state of Idaho as may be expedient, in addition to the 
special powers in this act granted, to maintain the peace, 
good government and welfare of the corporation and its 
trade, commerce and industry. Cities may enforce all 
ordinances by fine, including an infraction penalty, or 
incarceration; provided, however, except as provided in 
subsection (2) of this section, that the maximum 
punishment of any offense shall be by fine of not more than 
one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment not to 
exceed six (6) months, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment. 
(2) Any city which is participating in a federally mandated 
program, wherein penalties or enforcement remedies are 
required by the terms of participation in the program, may 
enforce such requirements by ordinance, to include a 
criminal or civil monetary penalty not to exceed one 
thousand dollars ($1,000), or imprisonment for criminal 
offenses not to exceed six (6) months, or to include both a 
fine and imprisonment for criminal offenses. 
The Idaho Legislature has specifically addressed various trades, commerce, and 
industries a city may regulate under I.C. § 50-302(a), e.g., transit and domestic water 
systems. 
I.C. § 50-323 provides: 
Domestic water systems. 
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Cities are hereby empowered to establish, create, develop, 
maintain and operate domestic water systems; provide for 
domestic water from wells, streams, water sheds or any 
other source; provide for storage, treatment and 
transmission of the same to the inhabitants of the city; and 
to do all things necessary to protect the source of water 
from contamination. The term "domestic water systems" 
and Hdomestic waterH includes by way of example but not 
by way of limitation, a public water system providing water 
at any temperature for space heating or cooling, culinary, 
sanitary, recreational or therapeutic uses. 
I.e. § 50-1030(f) provides: 
Powers. 
In addition to the powers which it may now have, any city 
shall have power under and subject to the following 
provisions: 
(f) To prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges, 
including the levy or assessment of such rates, fees, tolls or 
charges against governmental units, departments or 
agencies, including the state of Idaho and its subdivisions, 
for the services, facilities and commodities furnished by 
such works, or by such rehabilitated existing electrical 
generating facilities, and to provide methods of collections 
and penalties, including denial of service for nonpayment 
of such rates, fees, tolls or charges; 
Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-9 provides: 
DWELLING WITHOUT WATER SERVICE DECLARED 
A HEALTH HAZARD AND A PUBLIC NUISANCE: 
The human habitation of any residence or use of any other 
building or structure for purposes other than warehousing 
or storage of nonperishable goods or commodities where no 
workers regularly labor without a ready supply of running 
potable water whether from the city system or other 
authorized source, inside of such dwelling or other 
structure shall constitute a health hazard and a public 
nuisance. In such circumstances the city may cause 
proceedings to be brought for the abatement of the 
occupancy or use of such a place. 
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A. Habitation Of Dwelling Without Water Service 
Unlawful: The human habitation of any residential 
dwelling or other building or structure without a required 
source of running potable water as required by this chapter 
shall be unlawful and subject to the penalty described in 
section 7-4-11 of this chapter. (Ord. 430, 8-22-1998). 
Freitas argues that I.C. § 50-1030(f) limits a city to only collecting fees for a 
service provided by the city, and it also limits penalties to denial of services, but not to 
criminal prosecution. 
This Court disagrees. I.C. § 50-302 grants cities the right to create and maintain 
domestic water systems. I.C. § 50-1030(f) provides that a city may penalize a user, 
including denying service. The including language is what Freitas argues limits Spirit 
Lake from making a violation of the Ordinance a criminal penalty. However, Article XII 
§ 2 of the Idaho Constitution and I.C. § 50-302 provide that a city may create ordinances 
to maintain the peace, good government and welfare of the corporation and its trade, 
commerce and industry. Further, cities may enforce all ordinances by fine, including an 
infraction penalty, or incarceration. 
Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-9 shows that the City is attempting to maintain the 
welfare of its citizens by ensuring that residences have running, potable water to prevent 
health hazards. Further, the remaining sections of Chapter 4, Domestic Water Ordinance, 
show that the City is attempting to maintain the welfare of its trade, commerce, and 
industry, i.e. the City's water system. Spirit Lake Ordinance 4-7-11 provides the penalty 
for violation of Ordinance 7-4-10, as allowed by the Idaho Legislature pursuant to I.C. § 
50-1030(f) and Article XII § 2 of the Idaho Constitution. 
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Freitas also asserted that it is not proper to criminalize charitable acts. That may 
be true in a generalized way, but in this situation, Freitas could have assisted the Nash 
family by numerous "legal" methods, e.g., paying the re-connection fee, paying the 
Nash's water bill, or allowing the Nash family to utilize Freitas' water inside his home 
(showers, toilets, etc.). 
Therefore, the Ordinance is constitutional on its face and as applied to the facts of 
this case. As such, the magistrate did not err by denying Freitas' Motion to Dismiss. 
C. Did the magistrate instruct the jury with the correct elements? 
Freitas argues that the Magistrate did not properly read the Ordinance and 
instructed the jury with the wrong elements. Specifically, Freitas asserts that the 
Ordinance relates to doing harm to the City's water system or illegally connecting to the 
water system; however, the magistrate provided elements relating to delivering water to 
third persons. 
Criminal statutes must be strictly construed. State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 325, 
806 P .2d 413, 418 (1990). In State v. Gleason, the Idaho Supreme Court provided, "[o]n 
the issue of the jury instruction, we review the same to determine whether it charges the 
jury with all matters necessary for their information with respect to the nature and 
elements of the crime charged." 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 P.2d 691,694 (1992) (citation 
omitted). 
The record shows that at the January 3, 2012, hearing on Freitas' Motion to 
Dismiss, the magistrate stated in his oral ruling: 
Essentially, what it prohibits, is uh, improperly connecting 
to the City water system, improperly interfering with or 
tampering with that system, uh, improperly turning on or 
off the water system, uh, improperly connecting and 
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delivering water to third persons under certain 
circumstances, and then improperly operating or 
introducing a substance into any part of the water system, 
again under certain circumstances. 
Motion Hearing Transcript (Vol. 1), p. 27 at 11. 1 0-17 (emphasis added). 
The magistrate's understanding of the Ordinance's elements at the Motion to 
Dismiss are sufficiently accurate. 5 
The trial transcript contains a record of the elements instruction, which provides: 
You're instructed that the essential elements of the crime of 
unlawful act regarding water system which the defendant is 
charged are: One, on or about the 28th of September 2012; 
two, in Kootenai County, State of Idaho; three, the 
defendant, Michael 1. Freitas, permitted connection or 
delivery of city water; four, to third persons; five, for use 
within a residence; six, not otherwise provided with water 
service. If any of the above has not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant guilty. 
Trial Transcript, p. 104,11. 17-25; p. 105, 11.1-3. 
This Court finds that these are the applicable elements for the crime charged in 
this matter under the Ordinance, and as alleged by the state. 
Therefore, Freitas was tried under the appropriate elements of the Ordinance, for 
the criminal act he was alleged to have committed. The magistrate did not err in 
instructing the jury. 
D. Did the Magistrate properly deny Freitas's Motion for Acquittal? 
Freitas argues that the only evidence presented at trial relating to the source of the 
water was provided by Officer Wise, which is insufficient to show that the water at issue 
5 Freitas only requested proposed instruction No.6 to be included with the standard Clerk's Record. 
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was provided by the City of Spirit Lake's water system. Freitas asserts that the water 
may have come from some other source that is attached to the water meter. 
The State argues that Freitas's LC.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal was 
properly denied because Officer Wise testified that at the time of issuing the citation 
Freitas stated he was paying for the water running through his meter and he could do with 
it what he wanted. As such, the state asserts, there is substantial circumstantial evidence, 
if not direct evidence, when viewed in light most favorable to the state, that Freitas was 
paying for the City's water. 
I.C.R. 29(a) provides: 
Motion before submission to jury. The court on motion of 
the defendant or on its own motion shall order the entry of 
judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in 
the indictment, information or complaint after the evidence 
on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to 
sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. If a 
defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of 
the evidence offered by the state is not granted, the 
defendant may offer evidence. In the event the court 
dismisses the charged offense, the court must consider 
whether the evidence would be sufficient to sustain a 
conviction on a lesser included offense. 
In reviewing a denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court 
must independently consider the evidence in the record and determine whether a 
reasonable mind could conclude that a defendant's guilt as to each material element of 
the offence was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Willard, 129 Idaho 827, 828, 
933 P.2d 116, 117 (Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted). The test of sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain a conviction is whether there is substantial evidence upon which 
rational triers of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Rodriguez, 106 
Idaho 30, 674 P.2d 1029 (Ct. App. 1983). When a motion for judgment of acquittal has 
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been denied, and the defendant stands convicted, all reasonable inferences on appeal are 
taken in favor of the prosecution. State v. 0 'Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d 985 (et. 
App.1982). 
The record shows that there was testimony by several witnesses as to the elements 
relating to date of commission of the crime and the location. As to elements four, five 
and six, the record shows that there was substantial and competent evidence that Nash 
and her family (third persons) were receiving water at Adams's residence. Further, 
Officer Wise testified that she observed a water hose attached to Freitas's residence and 
Adams's residence that was leaking enough water to form a puddle. There was also 
testimony from Barbara Brown that the Adams residence did not have water service at 
the time. 
As to the third element (connection to or delivery of city water) the record shows 
that Officer Wise testified to her interaction with Freitas on September 28, 2012. 
Q. Okay. And did you have any conversation with Freitas at that point? 
A. I did have - it was a short one. And Mr. Freitas said that - it was something 
to the effect that urn, he didn't really realize - he didn't think that there was 
anything wrong as far - as long as the water was going through his meter and he's 
paying for it, that he said he should be able to do whatever he wanted to do with 
his water, that he could put it in his yard or give it to a neighbor. 
Q. Okay. So Mr. Freitas said that he was paying for the water he was receiving at 
this home? 
A. Um-hrnm. 
Trial Transcript at p. 89, 1l. 19-25; p. 90, n. 1-6. 
Q. So the statement, ifI'm - understood you correctly that Mr. Freitas said was 
that he could do whatever he wanted with his water. 
A. Yes. As long as he was paying for it; it went through his meter. 
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Id at p. 90, 11. 16-20. 
As to the acquittal motion, the magistrate provided the LC.R. 29 standards and 
then stated: 
Court: Keeping in mind all the facts that have been presented in adopting the 
argument of 00, Ms. McClinton, the Court will deny your Rule 29 motion at this 
time. Anything further outside the presence of the jury? I do think the most 
interesting element there was whether or not this was city water, and I think Ms. 
McClinton's argument that he acknowledged having paid for it, 00, even if not 
expressly stated, certainly by implication, suggests that it is OO-it is 00, the city 
provided water. 
Id at p. 95,11.22-25; p. 96,11.1-6. 
Therefore, there was substantial and competent evidence as to whether Freitas 
delivered "city" water to the Adams residence. 
There was other evidence presented about the City's water system (Barbara 
Brown, City Clerk/Treasurer and water service record keeper) Adams's water being 
turned off. Brenda Nash testified that there was a hose connected to her residence, but 
she didn't really know where it was attached to. Further, Nash testified that Freitas was 
providing the water, according to Adams, because the water was turned off. 
Therefore, the Court finds Officer Wise's testimony as to Freitas's statement 
sufficient to establish that the source of the water was the City water system and through 
Freitas's meter to the Adams residence. As such, the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
was properly denied. 
E. Did the Magistrate properly refuse Freitas's proposed jury instruction 
No.6? 
Freitas asserts that his proposed jury instruction number six included the first 
portion of the Ordinance, which provided that the City of Spirit Lake owns the water 
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system up to the meter and/or shut off valve. This instruction was refused. As such, 
Freitas argues that because the Ordinance is so confusing, the entire Ordinance should 
have been given. 
The State argues that all it needed to prove was that Freitas permitted connection 
or delivery of city water to third persons, and Freitas's proposed instruction No.6 did not 
help in clarifying the elements of the criminal violation. 
"The issue of whether a particular jury instruction is necessary and whether the 
jury has been properly instructed is a matter of law over which this Court exercises free 
review." State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 472, 272 P.3d 417, 444 (2012) (quoting State 
v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966,971 (1996». 
Jury instructions must correctly inform the jury as to the elements of the crime 
charged. State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178, 181, 191 P.3d 1098, 1101 (2008). The 
question of whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which 
we exercise free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 414, 430 
(2009). When reviewing jury instructions, we ask whether the instructions as a whole, 
and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect applicable law. State v. Bowman, 124 
Idaho 936, 942, 866 P.2d 193, 199 (Ct. App. 1993). Jury instructions that fail to require 
the State to prove every element of the offense violate due process and, therefore, rise to 
the level of fundamental error. Hickman, 146 Idaho at 182, 191 P .3d at 1102. 
Freitas's Jury Instruction No.6 provided: 
The Spirit Lake city water system is property of the city up 
to and including any shutoff valve and/or meter which may 
be installed at or near the property line of any lot. 
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The record shows that at trial, Freitas's counsel argued that the instruction should 
be given because of Officer Wise's testimony as to Freitas's belief that the water 
belonged to him. Counsel asserted that Instruction No. 6 would help clarify the 
ownership issue for the jury. 
The record also shows that the state did not object to the giving of Instruction No. 
6, but the magistrate nevertheless refused the instruction. The magistrate provided: 
The Court determined it would not give that as it's not a 
clarifying uh, legal instruction that relates to any of the 
facts in dispute. While the elements certainly includes uh, 
delivery of water, there is just no factual dispute here 
regarding what is the property of what, what is the city 
water system, et cetera. 
Trial Transcript at p. 99, ll. 16~22. 
While this portion of the Ordinance may have been relevant to a charge involving 
tampering with the City's water system, damaging piping in Freitas's front yard or 
damaging piping outside of Freitas's property line, it does not speak to the pertinent 
charge of unlawful delivery of water. The jury only needed to determine if Freitas 
delivered water to a third person for use in a residence that did not have City water 
service. The ownership of the water system was irrelevant, and the Magistrate did not err 
by refusing Freitas's proposed jury instruction No.6. 
F. Did the Magistrate err by overruling Freitas's objections to the state's 
voir dire guestioning. 
Freitas argues that during voir dire the prosecuting attorney asked the potential 
jurors their opinions about the Ordinance, laws that they might believe to be ridiculous 
and the importance of laws in general. Freitas asserts that the magistrate erred by 
permitting the state to continue with this type of questioning after he objected. 
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The State argues that it asked questions regarding prospective jurors' thoughts on 
the Ordinance in order to detennine if any jurors thought the law was something that 
should not be taken very seriously in order to root out pre-conceived notions about the 
validity of the Ordinance and whether jurors would be able to try the case fairly. Further, 
even if the questions were improper, the state asserts, such error was harmless because 
the questioning did not affect Freitas's substantial rights. 
LC.R. 24(b) provides in pertinent part: 
The voir dire examination shall be under the supervision of 
the court and subject to such limitations as the court may 
prescribe in the futherance of justice and the expeditious 
disposition of the case. Any question propounded by an 
attorney to a prospective juror which is not directly relevant 
to the qualifications of the juror, or is not reasonably 
calculated to discover the possible existence of a ground for 
challenge, or has been previously answered, shall be 
disallowed by the court upon objection or upon the court's 
own initiative. 
Placing limits beyond which the voir dire examination may not properly go is a 
matter which rests in the sound discretion of the trial court; the exercise of such 
discretion will not be disturbed except for a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. 
Camarillo, 106 Idaho 310,678 P.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1984). In detennining whether the 
trial court abused its discretion, appellate courts inquire: (1) whether the trial court 
correctly perceived the issue as a discretionary one; (2) whether the trial court acted 
within the outer bounds of its discretion and consistently with the applicable legal 
standards; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600,768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989); State v. Ortiz, 148 
Idaho 38,41,218 P.3d 17,20 (Ct. App. 2009). 
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Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded. LC.R. 52. In determining whether an error has affected substantial 
rights or is harmless, the inquiry is whether it appears from the record that the error 
contributed to the verdict, leaving the appellate court with a reasonable doubt that the 
jury would have reached the same result had the error not occurred. State v. Bussard, 114 
Idaho 781, 760 P.2d 1197 eCt. App. 1988). 
The magistrate, in his discretion, allowed the questioning. This court finds no 
abuse of discretion because the state's questioning was relevant as to the charge alleged. 
Further, even if the state's particular questioning as to the jurors' thoughts about the 
Ordinance was allowed in error, such error is harmless because it does not appear from 
this record that the particular questions asked of potential jurors led to Freitas' 
conviction. 
V. Conclusion 
City of Spirit Lake Ordinance No. 7-4-10 is constitutional and the magistrate did 
not err by denying the Motion to Dismiss. Further, the magistrate did not error by 
denying the Motion for Acquittal, in instructing the jury, or by overruling the voir dire 
objections. 
The judgment of conviction is affirmed. 
DATED this 8 ~ day of August, 2013. 
LANSIN . HA YN S, District Judge 
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